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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE - PART II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
In the last issue of the Reporter, the first of a 
two-part article on scientific evidence was publish-
ed. See Scientific Evidence - Part I, 3 Public 
Defender Rptr. (Jan.-Feb. 1980). Part I examined a 
number of legal issues that are involved in the use 
of scientific evidence. This article focuses on par-
ticular scientific techniques. In an article of this 
scope, it is not possible to discuss all types of 
scientific evidence, nor is it possible to discuss 
any particular technique in detail. The purpose of 
the article is merely to highlight a number of foren-
sic procedures that have proved controversial or 
are frequently encountered in criminal practice. 
Knowledge of the various types of scientific 
evidence currently available in criminal investiga-
tions can be used in several ways by the defense· 
tor example, it can be used to challenge the ' 
testimony of a prosecution expert and to facilitate 
~ the presentation of a defense based on scientific 
1r evidence. In addition, such knowledge often will 
· enable the defense to question the absence of 
scientific evidence in the prosecution's case. If the 
government had the opportunity to use and pre-
sent scientific evidence but failed to do so this 
circumstance may be a persuasive factor i~ 
establishing reasonable doubt in the minds of the 
jurors. 
A number of texts deal with the subject of scien-
tific evidence. See A. Moenssens & F. lnbau Sci~ntific Evidence in Criminal Cases (2d ed.' 1978); 
J. Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence (2d ed. 
1974); C. McCormick, Evidence ch. 20 (2d ed. 1972). 
The Moenssens and lnbau text is undoubtedly the 
best single-volume reference work in the field· it C?~ers a wide _ra~ge of scientific techniques, pro-
VIdmg a descnpt1on of each as well as a discus-
sion of the legal developments and a bibliography. 
Another book that may prove useful is the FBI 
Handbook of Forensic Science (Rev. 1978). This 
text outlines the various services that are provided 
by the FBI laboratory. Its importance to defense 
c.ounsel lies in the fact that it sets forth the limita-
tiOns o_f m_any techniques and thus provides an 
authontat1ve text (learned treatise) for the im-
peachment of experts who overstate the conclu-
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
sions that may be drawn from these techniques. 
VOICEPRINT EVIDENCE 
Voiceprint identification is premised on the uni-
queness of each human voice (interspeaker 
variability). Since a speaker will not pronounce the 
same word in exactly the same way twice (in-
traspeaker variability), voiceprint identification 
d~pends on ~he extent that i~te~~peaker variability 
d1ffers from mtraspeaker vanabll1ty. The voiceprint 
technique involves the use of a sound spec-
trograph to produce a visual display (a spec-
trogram) of selected words and phrases from a 
tape recording. The examiner then compares a 
spectrogram obtained from the suspect with the 
spectrogram produced from a tape recording in-
volved with a crime. Like fingerprint firearm and 
handwriting comparisons, the comp~rison of spec-
trograms involves a subjective evaluation on the 
part of the examiner. 
Judicial acceptance of voiceprint evidence has 
had a checkered history. A number of courts have 
accepted such evidence. See U.S. v. Williams 583 
F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.'1117 
(1979); U.S. v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. 
Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1042 (1975); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 
1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 
N.E.2d 671 (1975). On the other hand, a number of 
courts, including the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme 
Courts of California, Michigan and Pennsylvania 
have rejected voiceprint evidence. See United 
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 
549 P.2d 1240 (1976); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 
391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 
257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth v. Tapa, 471 
Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977). 
State v. Olderman 
One Ohio case has considered the issue. In 
State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App.2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 
442 (1975), the court of appeals upheld the ad-
missibility of voiceprint evidence. The precedential 
value of 0/derman, however, is suspect for several 
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reasons. First, the court purported to apply the 
general acceptance test which requires that an in-
novative scientific technique be generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community as a prere-
quisite to admissibility. This test has been 
justified on the grounds that it "assures that those 
most qualified to assess the general validity of a 
scientific method will have the determinative 
voice." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 
743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the 
general acceptance standard, see Scientific 
Evidence - Part I at 2. The court in Olderman, 
however, did not look to the scientific community 
to determine whether voiceprint analysis had been 
generally accepted; rather, the court concluded 
that voiceprint evidence had satisfied the general 
acceptance standard solely on the basis of cases 
upholding the admissibility of the technique. In ef-
fect, the views of courts, not scientists, were deter-
minative. This does not comport with the rationale 
underlying the general acceptance standard. 
Second, even assuming that reliance on prior 
judicial decisions is a proper application of the 
general acceptance standard, the court's analysis 
remains troublesome. Although the court 
acknowledged that a number of cases had rejected 
voiceprint evidence, the court ignored those cases. 
These cases demonstrated that general accep-
tance has not been achieved. Moreover, several 
cases cited by the court as upholding voiceprint 
evidence did not apply the general acceptance 
test, see Worley v. State, 263 So.2d 613 (Fla. App. 
1972); Alea v. State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. App. 1972); 
Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 
(1971), and one of the cases cited as upholding the 
admissibility of voiceprint evidence was subse-
quently overturned. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 
24, 130 Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 (1976), overruling 
Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App.3d 778, 106 
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973). 
Third, after Olderman was decided the National 
Academy of Sciences, at the request of the FBI, 
appointed a committee to evaluate voiceprint iden-
tifications. The committee concluded: 
The practice of voice identification rests on the 
assumption that intraspeaker variability is less 
than or different from interspeaker variability. 
However, at present the assumption is not ade-
quately supported by scientific theory and data. 
Viewpoints about probable errors in identification 
decisions at present result mainly from various pro-
fessional judgments and fragmentary experimental 
results rather than from objective data represen-
tative of results in forensic applications. 
The Committee concludes that the technical 
uncertainties concerning the present practice of 
voice identification are so great as to require that 
forensic applications be approach with great cau-
tion. National Academy of Sciences, On the Theory 
and Practice of Voice Identification 2 (1979). 
Thus, the most recent and comprehensive study of 
voiceprints demonstrates that the scientific com-
munity has yet to accept the technique. In sum, 
the status of voiceprint evidence in Ohio is far 
from settled. 
See generally, A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scien-
tific Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 12 (2d ed. 
1978); 0. Tosi, Voice Identification, Theory and 
Legal Applications (1979); Siegel, Cross-
Examination of a "Voiceprint" Expert: A Blueprint 
For Trial Lawyers, 12 Grim. L. Bull. 509 (1976); An-
not., 49 A.L.R.3d 915 (1973). 
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POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE 
The polygraph technique is based on the 
assumption that psychological stress caused by 
the fear of detection will produce involuntary 
physiological responses - changes in blood 
pressure, pulse, respiration, and galvanic skin 
resistance. These responses are recorded on a 
chart by the polygraph machine and then 
evaluated by the examiner. Both the critics and 
proponents of polygraph evidence agree that the 
examiner plays the most crucial role in the techni-
que. His expertise is critical in determining 
suitability of a subject for testing, formulating pro-
per test quE;)stions, detecting attempts to mask or 
create chart reactions, stimulating a subject to 
react, and interpreting the results of the examina-
tion. For a further discussion of the polygraph 
technique, see J. Reid & F. lnbau, Truth and 
Deception (2d ed. 1977); S. Abrams, A Polygraph 
Handbook for Attorneys (1977); Legal Admissibility 
of the Polygraph (N. Ansley ed. 1975). 
From 1923 when the results of a polygraph ex-
amination were rejected in Frye v. United States, 
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), until the early 1970s 
polygraph evidence was excluded in virtually every 
reported decision. Since 1972 a number of courts 
have admitted, or have recognized a trial court's 
discretion to admit, polygraph evidence. Cases ad-
mitting polygraph results include United States v. 
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 
N.E.2d 120 (1974); State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 
P.2d 204 (1975). Cases recognizing trial discretion 
to admit polygraph evidence are cited in Tarlow, 
Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An 
Aid in Determining Credibility In a Perjury-Plagued 
System, 26 Hastings L.J. 917, 948-50 (1975). Two 
Ohio cases have admitted polygraph evidence not-
withstanding the absence of a stipulation. See 
State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 
(C.P.1977); State v. Hancock, 71 Ohio Ops.2d 458 
(C.P. 1974). The Sfms decision was based on the 
compulsory process clause. For other constitu-
tional arguments in support of admissibility, see 
Note, Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Pro-
cess Perspective, 55 Ind. L.J. 157 (1979); Scientific 
Evidence - Part I at 6. 
Admissibility by Stipulation 
Perhaps the most important development in this 
area has been the growing trend to admit evidencE 
of polygraph examinations if the parties stipulate 
in advance to the admissibility of the results. See 
J. Reid & F. lnbau, Truth and Deception 325-35 (2d 
ed. 1977); Comment, The Admissibility of 
Polygraph Evidence Pursuant to Stipulation in 
Criminal Proceedings, 5 Akron L. Rev. 235 (1972); 
Comment, Evidence: Lie Detector Tests - Effect 
of Prior Stipulation on Admissibility of Results, 18 
U. Fla. L. Rev. 527 (1965); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 
(1973). 
In State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 
1318 (1978), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
polygraph evidence pursuant to a stipulation is ad 
missible. In reaching this result, the Court explicit 
ly adopted the conditions for admissibility set 
forth in State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 
(1962). Those conditions include: (1) a written 
stipulation signed by the defendant, defense 
counsel and prosecutor, (2) judicial discretion to 
exclude the results notwithstanding the stipulation 
if the trial judge is not satisfied the examiner is 
qualified or the test was conducted properly, (3) an 
opportunity for the opposing party to cross-
~~~~ examine the examiner regarding his qualifications, 
IJ the procedures employed in conducting the ex-
amination, the limitations of the technique, the 
possibilities of error, as well as other pertinent 
matters, and (4) a jury instruction on the use and 
effect of polygraph evidence. See generally, Note, 
State v. Souel: Ohio Turns the Corner on Polygraph 
Evidence, 8 Cap. U.L. Rev. 287 (1978). 
A defense attorney who wishes to have the 
results of a stipulated polygraph examination ad-
mitted in evidence faces a number of problems. 
First, before raising with the prosecutor the 
possibility of a stipulated examination, the 
defense attorney should arrange to have his client 
examined by a defense expert. The reasons for this 
precaution are self-evident. The client will waive 
the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination by agreeing to the examination, see 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966), 
and counsel should not advise such a waiver 
without first knowing the probable results of the 
examination. The pre-stipulation examination, 
however, may raise the problem of the "friendly 
polygrapher." Dr. Martin Orne has described this 
problem as follows: 
The guilty individual when tested by a friendly 
polygrapher knows that the results of the test if he 
is found deceptive will not be used against him .... 
As a consequence, the client's fears about being 
detected are greatly reduced. As we have been able 
to show in the laboratory, and as is acknowledged 
.fla by all polygraph experts, a suspect's fear of detec-\~ tion is the major factor in assuring his augmented 
physiological response while lying. It is precisely 
this aspect of the situation which is most 
dramatically altered when the polygraph is 
employed by the defendant's attorney. Orne, Im-
plications of Laboratory Research for Detection of 
Deception, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 
94, 114-15 (N. Ansley ed. 1975). 
If Orne's theory is correct, the client may pass the 
defense-sponsored examination but not the ex-
amination administered pursuant to the stipula-
- tion. Thus, it may be advisable not to inform the 
='Client that the first examiner is "friendly." 
Second, care should be exercised in preparing 
.. the stipulation. This requires a thorough 
knowledge of the polygraph technique. The stipula-
- tion should state explicitly that the examiner is not 
, •. to interrogate the client. Moreover, counsel should 
~:-~-be present during the examination to ensure that 
- interrogation does not ensue either before or after 
the examination. 
f;C•Admissibility in Collateral Proceedings 
;3s Inroads into the general rule excluding 
~;•7Polygraph evidence have not been limited to the 
.~~st_ip.ulation cases. A number of courts, while not 
1'''-:'lllmg to admit the results of polygraph examina-
;'*•;trons at trial, have admitted such evidence in other 
·~ contexts. The rationale for such an approach was 
· ·.. ted by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. 
ara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977). In 
ing that polygraph evidence could be con-
ered in ruling on a motion for a new trial, the 
rt commented: "Since the defendant's guilt or 
nee is not at issue, some procedures are 
issible which would not be acceptable at 
3 
trial." /d. at 411,255 N.W.2d at 197. See also State 
v. Cantanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La. 1979); Note, Peo-
ple v. Barbara: The Admissibility of Polygraph Test 
Results in Support of a Motion tor New Trial, 1978 
Det. C.L. Rev. 347; Note, Admissibility of Polygraph 
at Post-Conviction Hearings on Motion tor New 
Trial, 55 U. Det. J. Urban L. 155 (1977); Note, 
Criminal Law- Polygraph Examination Results 
Admissible in Post-Conviction Hearings, 56 N.C. L. 
Rev. 380 (1978). 
In addition, polygraph evidence has been admit-
ted in suppression and sentencing hearings. See 
People v. Cutter, 12 Grim. L. Rptr. 2133 (L.A. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 6, 1972); State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546,521 
P.2d 978 (1974); State v. Watson, 115 N.J. Super. 
213, 278 A.2d 543 (1971 ). 
GUNSHOT RESIDUE TESTS 
Gunshot residue tests are used to determine 
whether a person recently has fired a weapon, a 
determination which can be important in identify-
ing an assailant, proving or rebutting a self-
defense claim, and distinguishing a suicide from a 
homicide. All tests are designed to detect powder 
or primer residues which, due to the backblast of 
gases which escape through crevices in the 
weapon, may be deposited on the hand of a per-
son discharging a gun. 
The "Paraffin Test" 
The "paraffin test," which was designed to 
detect nitrate and nitrite residues (powder 
residues), was first introduced in this country in 
the early 1930s and was adopted quickly by law 
enforcement agencies. A paraffin cast is used to 
remove the residues from the hands at which time 
the cast is treated with a reagent, either 
diphenylamine or diphenylbenzidine. The ap-
pearance of blue specks indicates a positive reac-
tion. The admissibility of evidence based on this 
test has been upheld by a number of courts. The 
first reported case accepting the test was Com-
monwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 
(1936), and cases following Westwood are found 
through the 1960s. See Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 
771, 394 S.W.2d 135 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 
964 (1967); State v. Hoy, 199 Kan. 340, 430 P.2d 275 
(1967); People v. Simpson, 5 Mich. App. 479, 146 
N.W.2d 828 (1966); State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 
(Mo. 1968) . 
Notwithstanding judicial acceptance, the paraf-
fin test is seriously deficient because it is nonspe-
cific; a significant number of substances other 
than gunpowder residues contain nitrates and 
nitrites and therefore also produce a positive reac-
tion. One study reported that a positive reaction is 
produced by" 'rust,' colored fingernail polishes, 
residue from evaporated urine, soap and tap 
water." Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin 
Test," 12 J. Forensic Sci. 19, 23 (1967). Another 
study found that "[t]obacco or tobacco ash, fer-
tilizer, pharmaceuticals, leguminous plants, urine . 
... " produce a reaction. Turkel & Lipman, 
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test tor Gunpowder, 
46 J. Grim. L., C. & P.S. 281, 282 (1955). As a result 
of these and other studies, a number of courts 
have rejected the paraffin test. See Brooke v. Peo-
ple, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959); Born v. 
State, 397 P.2d 924 (Okla. Grim. 1964), cert. denied 
379 U.S. 100 (1965); Clarke v. St~te, 218 Tenn. 259, 
402 S.W.2d 863 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 942 
(1966). Moreover, the FBI has ceased to use the 
paraffin test. See Gunshot Residues and Shot Pat-
tern Tests, 39 FBI Law Enforcement Bull. 7 (Sept. 
1970). 
See generally, A. · Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scien-
tific Evidence in Criminal Cases 584 (2d ed. 1978); 
Conrad, Evidential Implications of the Dermal 
Nitrate Test tor Gunpowder Residues, 44 Marq. L. 
Rev. 500 (1961); Midkoff, Detection of Gunshot 
Residues: Modern Solutions for an Old Problem, 3 
J. Police Sci. & Ad. 77 (1975). 
Harrison-Gilroy Test 
In 1959 a new method of gunshot residue detec-
tion was reported by Harold Harrison and Robert 
Gilroy. See Harrison & Gilroy, Firearms Discharge 
Residues, 4 J. Forensic Sci. 184 (1959). Unlike the 
paraffin test, the Harrison-Gilroy test was designed 
to detect primer, rather than powder, residues -
the elements antimony, barium, and lead. Thus, 
the nonspecificity problem associated with the 
paraffin test was obviated. Nevertheless, the 
Harrison-Gilroy test was not adopted widely 
because of its marginal sensitivity. See Pillay, New 
Method tor the Collection and Analysis of Gunshot 
Residues as Forensic Evidence, 19 J. Forensic Sci. 
769 (1974). 
There have been few reported decisions involv-
ing this test. In Commonwealth v. Farrior, 446 Pa. 
31, 284 A.2d 684 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court upheld the admissiblity of the Harrison-
Gilroy test. The court, however, cited Com-
monwealth v. Westwood, a paraffin test case, as 
authority for its holding, apparently believing that 
the two tests were identical. In State v. Smith, 50 
Ohio App.2d 183, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (1976), a police 
officer claimed to have used a modified version of 
the Harrison-Gilroy test to detect residues on the 
defendant's hand. The test was rejected on appeal. 
According to the appellate court, the evidence in 
the record failed to establish that the officer was 
qualified "either to testify as to the theoretical 
basis of a new test for determining the presence 
of gunshot residue or to give expert testimony that 
such a test was generally accepted in the scien-
tific community." /d. at 193, 362 N.E.2d at 1246. 
Instrumental Analysis 
Currently, a variety of instrumental techniques 
are used to detect gunshot residues. Perhaps the 
most common is neutron activation analysis. This 
method of analysis is discussed intra. In addition, 
atomic absorption spectrometry has been used in 
several cases. Like the Harrison-Gilroy test and ac-
tivation analysis, this method is designed to detect 
the primer residues antimony and barium. The 
technique is described in Watkins & Watkins, Iden-
tification of Substances by Instrumental Analysis, 
22 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 385, 476-87 (1969); 
Midkiff, Detection of Gunshot Residues: Modern 
Solutions tor an Old Problem, 3 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 
77 (1975). Several cases have accepted atomic ab-
sorption as a method of gunshot residue detec-
tion. See Chatom v. State, 48 So.2d 828 (Ala. Grim. 
Ap.), rev'd 348 So.2d 838 (Ala.), acq. 348 So.2d 843 
(Ala. Grim. App. 1977); State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 
42, 203 S.E.2d 38 (1974), modified on other 
grounds, 428 U.S. 903 (1976); State v. Chatman, 156 
N.J. Super. 35, 383 A.2d 440 (1978). 
One other method of detection has received 
judicial consideration. In People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. 
4 
App.3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978), the court 
upheld the detection of gunshot residues by scan-
ning electron microscopic analysis. See generally, 
Anrasko & Maehly, Detection of Gunshot Residues 
on Hands by Scanning Electron Microscopy, 22 J. 
Forensic Sci. 279 (1977); Matricardi & Kilty, Detec-
tion of Gunshot Residue Particles from the Hands 
of a Shooter, 22 J. Forensic Sci. 725 (1977). 
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS 
Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) is a 
qualitative and quantitative method for determin-
ing the elemental composition of substances. A 
sample is first subjected to neutron bombardment 
in a nuclear reactor under controlled conditions. 
Once removed from the reactor, the irradiated 
substance tends to return to a stable atomic state 
(radioactive decay) during which time subatomic 
particles are emitted from the sample. One type of 
particle, gamma rays, is then detected and 
counted by means of gamma ray spectrometry. 
Since each element has a characteristic energy 
level of gamma radiation and a known rate of 
decay (half-life), these two indicia are used to 
determine the elemental composition of the sam-
ple. 
NAA is forensically applied in two types of ex-
aminations. First, it is used in situations in which 
only the presence or absence of one or more 
elements is significant. For example, in the detec-
tion of gunshot residues, NAA is used to detect 
the presence and quantity of the elements an-
timony and barium on the hands of a person 
suspected of discharging a weapon. These 
elements are the primer constituents of most 
American-manufactured ammunition and their 
presence in certain concentrations is indicative of 
a recent discharge of a firearm. Second, NAA is 
used for comparative purposes. Trace elements in 
hair, blood, paint, soil, glass, bullets, drugs, and 
other substances discovered at a crime scene can 
be compared with•similar items obtained from a 
suspect. 
Because NAA is extremely sensitive, minute 
samples such as a single hair or paint chip can be 
analyzed. In some cases NAA is nondestructive, 
and therefore the evidence can be re-examined or 
introduced undamaged at trial. Nevertheless, the 
expense associated with operating a nuclear reac-
tor is a disadvantage; only the major government, 
university, and industrial laboratories have the 
capability to conduct this type of analysis. 
Admissibility of NAA Evidence 
The theory of NAA is well accepted by the scien-
tific community. Moreover, the technique - the 
use of a nuclear reactor irradiation and gamma ray 
spectrometry for detection - is recognized as an 
accurate analytical method of detection for many 
elements. Thus, it is not surprising that most 
courts that have considered NAA evidence have 
upheld its admissibility. E.g., U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 
431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) 
(analysis of bomb debris); People v. Collins, 43 
Mich. App. 259, 204 N.W.2d 290 (1972), aft'd, 391 
Mich. 798 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974) 
(hair analysis); State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216 
N.W. 2d 131 (1974) (gunshot residue); State v. 
Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd 
on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (particle 
analysis); State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009 (Ore. 
1974) (bullet analysis). See also Annat., 50 A.L.R.3d 
117 (1973). 
Several courts, however, have held NAA 
- evidence inadmissible for a variety of reasons. in 1(1 U.S. v_. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1969~, t~e Second 
Circuit reversed the defendant's conv1ct1on for 
drug offenses because the prosecution failed to 
provide the defendant with adequate notice o~ ac-
tivation analysis of the drugs. in State v. Coolidge, 
109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd on other 
grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the court upheld the 
admissibility of activation analysis of particles but 
rejected NAA of hair samples. According to the 
court, hair analysis "would not be acceptable to 
scientists in the field" and thus would not satisfy 
the general acceptance standard. !d. at 420, 260 
A.2d at 560. in State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 
1972), the court rejected NAA of blood because 
this type of analysis also had not gained general 
acceptance in the scientific community. /d. at 371. 
The Ohio Supreme Court considered the ad-
missibility of NAA in State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d 
81, 246 N.E. 365 (1969). The Court held that the 
results of activation analysis of hair was inad-
missible. The Court, however, did not challenge 
directly the reliability of the technique; instead, the 
Court reversed because the NAA expert testified 
that the hair samples were likely to have come 
(rather than probably came) from the same source. 
Interpretation Problems 
The major problem associated with NAA 
evidence involves the interpretation of the results 
of activation analysis and not the validity of the 
~technique. For example, in the detection of gun-
'll shot residues, NAA is used to detect the presence 
·j and quantity of the elements antimony and barium 
on the hands of a person suspected of firing a 
weapon. In State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216 
N.W.2d 131 (1974), a government expert testified 
that NAA revealed the presence of 1.67 
micrograms of barium and 1.33 micrograms of an-
timony on the defendant's hands, thus conclusive-
ly establishing, in the expert's opinion, that the 
defendant recently had fired a gun. 
The presence and quantity of antimony and 
,-:-barium, however, have no probative value unless 
· the detected amounts differ from normal concen-
trations of these elements in the general popula-
tion. The relevance of this type of information, 
" therefore, depends on the validity of background 
studies of the general population and the proper 
,, correlation of these studies with the data derived 
::~from the analysis in a particular case. In short, 
NAA involves a problem of statistical probability. 
'"See Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron 
:=Activation Analysis, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 997 (1971). 
~Jhus, one commentator has suggested that the 
~,::~(jefense stipulate to the test results, and thereby 
~f~s>cus the jury's attention on the interpretation 
.,;:!ssue. !d. at 1035-36. This tactic also would focus 
~~~ttention on the expert's qualifications because 
,,,·e~pertise in statistics, not chemistry, is critical. 
.;,•finally, concentrating on the interpretative aspects ~l NAA may expose the exaggerated claims of 
~~orne experts, such as statements that NAA is "as 
~~nfallible as that of fingerprints." State v. Cool!dge, ri~-s09 N.H. 403, 420, 260 A.2d 547, 560 (1969), rev don ~~!her grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also State 
lv(WSpencer, 298 Minn. 456,461,216 N.W.2d 131,_134 i;.1~,;.·974) ("We are concerned ... about the sweeping 
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and unqualified manner in which [the NAA 
expert's] testimony was offered."). 
See also Watkins & Watkins, Identification of 
Substances by Neutron Activation Analysis, 15 
AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 115 (1964); A. Moenssens 
& F. Jnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 
ch. 9 (2d ed. 1978). 
TRACE METAL DETECTION TECHNIQUE 
Closely associated with gunshot residue tests, 
is the trace metal detection technique (TMDT). This 
test, however, is not used to establish that a per-
son recently has fired a gun; it is used to establish 
that a person has handled a metal object, which 
may have been a gun. TMDT was developed pur-
suant to a grant by the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration. See LEAA, Trace Metal 
Detection Technique in Law Enforcement (Oct. 
1970). According to that study, "[r]esearch has 
determined that metal objects leave traces on skin 
and clothing surfaces in characteristic patterns 
with intensities proportional to the interaction of 
weight, friction, or duration of contact with metal 
objects. The Trace Metal Detection Technique 
(TMDT) makes such metal trace patterns visible 
when skin or clothing is treated with a test solu-
tion and then is illuminated by ultraviolet light." /d. 
at 1. The pattern is photographed once it becomes 
visible. /d. at 6. 
Three reported cases, including one from Ohio, 
have considered the admissibility of TMDT 
evidence. In two ofthese cases, State v. Daniels, 
37 Ohio App.2d 4, 305 N.E.2d 497 (1973), and Reid 
v. State, 2671nd. 555,372 N.E.2d 1149 (1978), ad-
missibility was upheld. Nevertheless, both cases 
present problems. Daniels, the first reported case 
involving TMDT, illustrates these problems. First, 
in that case evidence derived from TMDT was 
based on the testimony of a "ballistics expert." 
Although TMDT is des1gned to connect a person 
with the handling of a gun, the expertise needed to 
conduct this test is in no way related to the exper-
tise of a firearms identification ("ballistics") ex-
aminer. Second, even if the police officer who 
testified was qualified to perform the test, he was 
not a scientist and therefore was not qualified to 
testify about the validity of the underlying theory 
of TMDT. Third, the court in Daniels did not apply 
the general acceptance test for the admissibility of 
novel scientific evidence. This test has been ac-
cepted by the Ohio courts of appeal. See Scientific 
Evidence - Part I at 2. 
The Reid decision raises similar problems. In 
that case the expert testified that "his knowledge 
concerning TMDT came from a seminar presented 
by the manufacturer of the chemical solution, writ-
ten instructions that accompanied the chemical 
and his personal experience in conducting such 
tests upon approximately fifteen occasions. He ad-
mitted that he had no understanding of the reason 
for the reaction that occurred when such test was 
administered." 267 Ind. at 559, 372 N.E.2d at 1152. 
Nevertheless, the court admitted the evidence. In 
support of its decision, the court offered only a 
barren and unadorned conclusion - "we believe 
[TMDT] is generally recognized as reliable." /d. In 
contrast, TMDT evidence was rejected in People v. 
Lauro, 91 Misc.2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977), 
because there was "absolutely no testimony 
before the Court as to this test having been receiv-
ed in any court or in the literature of forensic 
science; nor is there any scientific data presented 
to show the reliability of this test." /d. at 712, 398 
N.Y.S.2d at 507. 
In addition, a study of TMDT has revealed 
several major problems with the technique. See 
Stevens & Messler, The Trace Metal Detection 
Technique (TMDT): A Report Outlining a Procedure 
tor Photographing Results in Color, and Some Fac-
tors Influencing the Results in Controlled 
Laboratory Tests, 19 J. Forensic Sci. 496 (1974). 
First, that study "quickly disclosed the inadequacy 
of relying solely upon black-and-white photographs 
.... " /d. at 498. Second, "it is far better, whenever 
possible, to have the actual weapon involved 
available in order to directly compare any patterns 
observed on the suspect and the pattern known to 
result from handling that particular gun. There is 
always the possibility that the particular gun or 
tool used in the commission of a crime might im-
part a pattern sufficiently unique as to make a 
positive connection between the instrument and 
suspect possible. In any event, we strongly sug-
gest that prospective users of the technique give 
some consideration to establishing a policy of 
routinely refusing requests to perform examina-
tions unless the gun is available for direct com-
parison, at least until the observer has acquired 
considerable experience and familiarity with the 
various patterns." ld. at 500. This statement sug-
gests that objects other than a gun may produce a 
pattern that may appear consistent with a gun pat-
tern. Third, the utility of the test varies between 
subjects: "Some individuals always seemed to be 
good subjects for the tests, while others con-
sistently displayed indistinct or moderately intense 
patterns." /d. at 501. Finally, the utility of the test 
varies depending on the object; the test "is in-
fluenced greatly by factors concerning the surface 
conditions of the object material. Indeed, some 
guns failed to produce any patterns under any con-
ditions." /d. 
See also Goldman & Thornton, A New Trace Fer-
rous Metal Detection Reagent, 21 J. Forensic Sci. 
625 (1976); Glass & Grais, A New Trace Metal 
Detection Reagent, 26 J. Forensic Sci. 247 (1979). 
BITE MARK COMPARISONS 
In recent years a number of courts have admit-
ted expert testimony concerning the comparison of 
bite mark impressions found on a homicide 
victim's body with im'pressions of a defendant's 
dentition. E.g., People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App.3d 100, 
126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975); People v. Slone, 76 Cal. 
App.3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978); People v. 
Milone, 43 Ill. App.3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976). 
See also Annat., 77 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1977). 
The principal problem with bite mark evidence 
involves the interpretation of the comparative 
analysis. For example, in Slone the expert testified 
that "it is very highly probable that the bite mark 
on the victim was perpetrated by teeth belonging 
to the defendant." /d. at 621, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 67. 
In State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 
(1978), the expert went much further, testifying, 
"that there is an eight in one million probability 
that the teeth marks found on the deceased 
breasts were not made by appellant." /d. at 258, 
585 P.2d at 566. Such testimony overstates the 
conclusions that may be drawn from bite mark 
comparisons. Dr. Irvin Sopher has written: 
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The problem of specificity in the bite mark 
analysis results from the lack of a scientific core of 
basic data for comparison. The results of the bite 
mark comparison may indicate a perfect or 
reasonably perfect fit between the bite mark and a 
suspect's dentition; however, how can one be ab-
solutely or even perhaps reasonably certain that no 
other individual could have produced a particular 
bite? Classified bite mark charcteristics on large 
segments of the population are unavailable; 
therefore, an absolute scientific estimation of 
specificity regarding the particular bite 
mark/suspect comparison is not possible. The 
situation is comparable to the point in the distant 
past when the 100th set of fingerprints was 
classified. At that time, it was known that the set 
of prints did not match the ninety-nine others . 
previously recorded, but it was not known if the set 
of prints were specific for only the one individual 
fingerprinted. I. Sopher, Forensic Dentistry 140 
(1976). 
Although it is highly unlikely that a positive 
identification can be made by bite mark com-
parison, often it is possible to eliminate a suspect 
through this technique. If the comparison shows 
that the defendant's dentition is inconsistent with 
the bite mark, it follows that the defendant's teeth 
could not have made the mark. See Dinkel, The 
Use of Bite Mark Evidence as an Investigative Aid, 
19 J. Forensic Sci. 535 (1974) ("Currently, the major 
contribution of bite mark evidence is the elimina-
tion of suspects since the establishment of a 
positive identification is rare.") 
See also A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 16 (2d ed. 1978); 
Note, The Admissibility of Bite-Mark Evidence, 51 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 309 (1978). 
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE 
Fingerprint identification evidence frequently is 
used to connect a suspect with a crime scene. 
There are only a few ways to challenge fingerprint 
evidence. First, "[o]ne of the limiting factors in 
fingerprint identifi<;;ation is that from a study of a 
latent fingerprint alone it cannot be determined at 
what time or date the impression was made." A. 
Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in 
Criminal Cases 389 (2d ed. 1978). Therefore, if it 
can be shown that the defendant had innocent ac-
cess to the place where the print was discovered, 
the probative value of the evidence becomes 
marginal. 
In State v. Miller, 49 Ohio St.2d 198, 361 N.E.2d 
419 (1977), the Ohio Supreme Court considered the 
sufficiency of fingerprint evidence. The Court 
stated: 
In determining the sufficiency of the fingerprint 
evidence, a reviewing court must examine this 
evidence on a case-by-case basis. The crucial issue 
is whether attendant circumstances, such as the 
location of the accused's alleged fingerprint, the 
character of the premises where the print was 
found, and the accessibility of the general public to 
the object on which the print was impressed are 
sufficient to justify the trier of fact to conclude not 
only that the accused was at the scene of the 
crime when it was committed, but also that the ac-
cused was the criminal agent. /d. at 202-03, 361 
N.E.2d at 422-23. 
Second, in cases of marginal ridge detail ex-
perts may disagree on whether fingerprint 
evidence is conclusive. There are a number of fac-
tors that may account for this disagreement: "A 
ridge count between two characteristics may be er-
roneous if dirt or dust has caused a ridge to ap-
pear as one or two islands; ... variation in 
_ pressure may cause discrepancies between prints 
[It! such as a bifurcation being registered in another 
\(Ill' print as an ending ridge; ... excess pressure in an 
inked print may squeeze several ridges together so 
that they may appear as one ridge; ... powder 
used to develop prints may stick between ridges, 
indicating the presence of a ridge characteristic 
where there is none .... " A. Moenssens & F. 
lnbau, supra, at 392. 
Fingerprint evidence also can be used affirm-
atively by the defense. For example, the discovery 
of crime-scene prints of a third party would assist 
the defense in establishing that the defendant had 
not committed the charged offense. The relevance 
of this type of evidence was recognized by the 
court in Corley v. State, 335 So.2d 849 (Fla. App. 
1976): "On this appeal from a conviction for se-
cond degree murder, we reverse for a new trial 
because of the trial court's erroneous exclusion of 
preferred testimony that the only identifiable 
fingerprints on a vodka bottle found on a couch 
near the victim's body were those of an uniden-
tified third person and had been made neither by 
the decedent nor the defendant. The evidence was 
plainly admissible in support of the defense that 
the crime was committed by someone other than 
the defendant .... " /d. at 850. 
See generally FBI, The Science of Fingerprints 
(1973); A. Moenssens, Fingerprints and the Law 
(1969); A. Moenssens, Fingerprint Techniques 
- (1971); Fingerprints, 5 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 77 
~ (1960). 
fl HAIR COMPARISONS 
In many crimes of violence, such as homicide 
and rape, there is an exchange of trace elements, 
such as hair and fibers, between the assailant and 
the victim~ The admissibility of hair comparisons 
has proved controversial, principally because pro-
secution experts have overstated the conclusions 
that can be drawn from such a comparison. Cur-
rently, an expert cannot state, except in a rare 
case, that a sample of hair came from a particular 
__ person. Thus, the FBI will reach one of the follow-
ing conclusions after comparing two samples: 
a. Hairs match in microscopic charcteristics and 
originated either from same individual or from 
another individual of same race whose hairs 
exhibit the same microscopic characteristics. 
b. Hairs are dissimilar and did not originate 
from same individual. 
c. No conclusion could be reached. FBI, Hand-
book of Forensic Science 25 (Rev. 1978). 
Obviously, the prosecution will introduce only 
testimony embracing the first conclusion. The pro-
bative value of this evidence depends, of course, 
on the number of persons "of the same race 
whose hairs exhibit the same microscopic 
characteristics." There could be a million people 
Who fall into that category. 
In order to enhance. the value of such evidence, 
some prosecutors have attempted to introduce 
statistical evidence. Evidence of the probability 
that a sample of hair came from the defendant 
easily can be misunderstood and misused. For a 
~ase illustrating such misuse, see U.S. v. Massey, 
594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979), in which the court 
reversed the defendant's conviction because 
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statistical evidence of hair analysis was presented 
erroneously to the jury. 
MISCELLANEOUS TECHNIQUES 
The scope of this article does not permit the ex-
amination of all the scientific techniques currently 
used in criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
Nevertheless, the following techniques (and 
references) are important and therefore are noted 
briefly. 
Forensic Pathology 
In most homicide prosecutions a forensic 
pathologist will be able to provide important infor-
mation concerning the cause and manner of death, 
the time of death, and the identification of the vic-
tim. There are a number of excellent texts on the 
subject. See L. Adleson, The Pathology of 
Homicide (1974); R. Fisher & C. Petty, A Handbook 
of Forensic Pathology for Non-Forensic 
Pathologists (1977); Gradwhol, Medicolegal In-
vestigation of Death (1972). See also A. Moenssens 
& F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 
ch. 5 (2d ed. 1978). 
Blood and Semen Examinations 
In many criminal investigations it is important to 
know whether a stain is human blood, and if 
human blood, the type. Moreover, the identification 
of a substance as semen is frequently crucial in 
rape prosecutions. Texts on blood and semen ex-
aminations include: A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, 
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 6 (2d ed. 
1978); C. McCormick Evidence§ 211 (2d ed. 1972); 
Examination of Biological Fluids, 41 FBI Law En-
forcement Bull. 12 (June 1972). 
Drug Analysis 
Prosecutions for the possession, sale, or 
distribution of controlled substances inevitably in-
volve the chemical analysis of the substance. A 
number of challenges to laboratory tests have 
been considered by the courts. See U.S. v. 
Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) (only 
L-cocaine proscribed by federal statute and 
polarimeter analysis required to detect this type of 
cocaine); State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1979) 
(upholding a trial court's ruling that common 
laboratory tests for marihuana failed to establish 
identity of seized substance). A number of texts 
and articles treat the subject of laboratory drug 
tests. See D. Bernheim, The Defense of Narcotics 
Cases ch. 4 (1972); F. L. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, 
Handling Narcotics and Drug Cases 290-95 (1972); 
Shapiro, Chemical Defenses in Drug Cases, 2 Nat'l 
J. Crim. Defense 131 (Spring 1976); Shellow, The 
Expert Witness in Narcotics Cases, in ABA, Effec-
tive Criminal Trial Techniques 173 (B. George ed. 
1978); Stein, Laessig & lndriksons, An Evaluation 
of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic 
Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their 
Analysis, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 727. 
Firearms Identifications 
Firearms identification is a well-established 
forensic technique. Firearms identification ex-
aminers often are referred to as "ballistics" ex-
perts; such a designation is erroneous because 
ballistics, the study of the motion of a projectile, 
has little to do with firearms identifications. In ad-
dition to comparative analysis of bullets, firearms 
identification experts are involved in an assort-
ment of related techniques such as toolmark iden-
tifications, cartridge case identifications, muzzle 
to target distance determinations, and obliterated 
serial numbers restoration. In an early case, an 
Ohio court accepted the testimony of a firearms 
identification examiner. See Burchett v. State, 35 
Ohio App. 463, 172 N.E 555 (1930). See also Annot., 
26 A.L.R.2d 892 (1952). See generally A. Moenssens 
& F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 
ch. 4 (2d ed. 1978); J. Mathews, Firearms Identifica-
tion (1973); Firearms Identification, 29 AM. JUR. 
Proof of Facts 65 (1962). 
Questioned Document Examinations 
Questioned document examiners frequently are 
encountered in criminal prosecutions, especially 
forgery and fraud cases. In addition to handwriting 
comparisons, questioned document examiners 
compare handprinting and typewriting as well as 
examine paper and watermarks. The Ohio cases 
are discussed in R. Markus, Handbook for Ohio 
Lawyers § 264 (1973). See generally A. Moenssens 
& F. lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 
ch. 10 (2d ed. 1978); J. Conway, Evidential 
Documents (1959); 0. Hilton, Scientific Examina-
tion of Documents (1956). 
Intoxication Tests 
Whether or not a defendant was intoxicated is a 
critical issue in driving under the influence, R.C. 
4511.19, and vehicular homicide prosecutions, R.C. 
2903.07. Evidence of intoxication also may be used 
to establish that a defendant did not possess the 
requisite mental state in homicide prosecutions. 
See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 341 (1972). 
The admissibility of intoxication tests is recogniz-
ed by R.C. 4511.19-.191. A number of cases have 
considered the admissibility of various intoxication 
tests. See State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 374 
N.E.2d 132 (1978); State v. Steele, 52 Ohio St.2d 
187, 370 N.E.2d 740 (1977); City of Columbus v. 
Marks, 118 Ohio App. 359, 194 N.E.2d 791 (1963). 
See generally A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 2 (2d ed. 1978); C. 
McCormick, Evidence § 209 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 
72 A.L.R.3d 325 (1976). 
Speed meters 
Evidence of the speed of an automobile as 
determined by radar and VASCAR has long been 
accepted by the courts. In State v. Aquilera, 25 
Grim. L. Rptr. 2189 (Fla. County Ct. 1979), however, 
a Florida trial court refused to accept radar 
evidence. The Aquilera decision has generated a 
nationwide debate on the reliability of radar and 
other types of speedmeters. See Schuon, Police 
Radar Examined Amid Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 
1979, § C, at 1, col. 1. Several Ohio cases have 
considered the admissibility of speedmeters. Most 
of these cases, however, were decided prior to the 
current controversy. See City of East Cleveland v. 
Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958) 
Uudicial notice of radar); State v. Shelt, 46 Ohio 
App.2d 115, 346 N.E.2d 345 (1976) (MR-7 radar 
device); State v. Wilcox, 40 Ohio App.2d 380, 319 
N.E.2d 615 (1974) (radar); State v. Bonar, 40 Ohio 
App.2d 360, 319 N.E.2d 388 (1973) (DC-7 radar 
8 
device); Tiffin v. Whitmer, 32 Ohio Misc. 169, 290 
N.E.2d 198 (1970) (VASCAR); City of Akron v. Gray, 
60 Misc. 68, 379 N.E.2d 429 (1979) (K-55 radar unit). 
See also State v. Boyington, 153 N.J. Super. 252, 
379 A.2d 486 (1977) (Decatur Ragun); State v. 
Musgrave, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2404 (N.J. Super. Ct. ~~f 
1979) (K-55 radar device). 
See also A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases ch. 13 (2d ed. 1978); C. 
McCormick, Evidence §210 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 47 
A.L.R.3d 822 (1973). 
Hypnotic Evidence 
The courts generally have excluded testimony of 
a witness while under hypnosis. A number of 
courts, however, have admitted the testimony of a 
witness whose memory has been stimulated by 
hypnosis. See Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 
F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Narciso, 446 F. 
Supp. 252, 277-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State v. Mc-
Queen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978). See 
generally A. Moenssens & F. lnbau, Scientific 
Evidence in Criminal Cases 632-38 (2d ed. 1978); 
Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic 
Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Suspectiblft?, 
38 Ohio St. L.J. 567 (1977); Herman, The Use of 
Hypno-lnduced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 
Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1964); Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 
(1979). 
Psychological Stress Evaluation 
The psychological stress evaluator (PSE) is an 
instrument that is designed to detect stress in the 
human voice and is used to determine whether a 
subject is being truthful or not. In short, it is a type 
of lie detector. It has not been shown, however, to 
be as reliable as the polygraph. The one case that 
considered the admissibility of PSE evidence, re-
jected it. See Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 
A.2d 527 (1976). See generally A. Moenssens & F. 
lnbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 638-43 
(2d ed. 1978); Note, The Psychological Stress 
Evaluator: Yesterday's Dream - Tomorrow's 
Nightmare, 24 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 299 (1975); Note, 
The Psychological Stress Evaluator: A Recent 
Development in Lie Detector Technology, 7 
U.C.D.L. Rev. 332 (1974). 
Remote Sensing Evidence 
Remote sensing evidence has been a factor in 
several criminal cases. See U.S. v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 
508 (9th Cir. 1978) (Forward Looking Infrared 
System used to establish the identity of aircraft 
held inadmissible); U.S. v. Mora-Chavez, 496 F.2d 
1181 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974) 
(ground sensors used to establish probable cause). 
The subject is treated exhaustively in Latin, Tan-
nehill & White, Remote Sensing Evidence and En-
vironmental Law, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1300 (1976). See 
also 19 Santa Clara L. Rev. 491 (1979). 
Photographic Evidence 
The most comprehensive work on photographic 
evidence, is a three-volume text: C. Scott, 
Photographic Evidence (2d ed. 1969). 
